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THE FORTUNES AND FOIBLES OF  
EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS: A POSITIVE MARKET RESPONSE 
TO THE PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
 
BY WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE* 
ABSTRACT 
One of the most dynamic and complex new investment vehicles on the 
market today is the exchange-traded fund (ETF), a security that provides 
the diversification of a mutual fund but trades on a securities exchange like 
a stock.  In just fifteen years, the number of ETFs has proliferated to well 
over 600, attracting more than half a trillion dollars in investment.  The 
majority of that expansion has occurred in just the past two years, largely 
as a consequence of recent difficulties in the mutual fund industry.  With 
ETF sponsors aggressively seeking to create novel kinds of ETFs and to 
add ETFs to retirement account menus, these funds are projected to 
continue growing at a pace far faster than hedge funds and mutual funds in 
the coming years. 
Yet, for all this extraordinary growth, legal scholars have virtually 
ignored ETFs.  This article seeks to establish a descriptive and conceptual 
framework for the scholarly discussion of these funds as they gain ever-
greater prominence, for good or for ill, in the coming years.  In exploring 
the structure, advantages, and shortcomings of ETFs, this article argues 
that ETFs are a positive market response to the shortcomings of mutual 
funds. 
ETFs use a novel pricing mechanism that harnesses the utility of 
arbitrage to provide investors with accuracy, efficiency, tax advantages, 
and a range of investment choices, while insulating investors from many of 
the structural problems associated with mutual funds.  Despite these advan-
tages, critics decry their brokerage fees and vulnerability to harmful short-
term trading.  This article argues that the mutual fund industry and its 
recent spate of dramatic scandals contributed to the emergence of ETFs 
and concludes that mutual funds offer vivid warnings of the conflicts of 
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"The market for exchange-traded funds will grow at a 29 per 
cent clip over the next five years—outpacing all other 
investment products including hedge funds and mutual funds 
. . . ." 
David Haywood, Financial Research Corporation1 
 
"There are 9,000 hedge funds, 8,000 mutual funds, and 500 
ETFs.  How can there be too many ETFs?  We are just at the 
start . . . ." 
Jonathan Steinberg, founder and CEO, WisdomTree 
Investments2 
 
"Many things going on in exchange traded funds are bordering 
on insanity." 
John C. Bogle, founder, Vanguard Group, Inc.3 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fifteen years ago, not a single exchange-traded fund (ETF) existed in 
the United States.  Today, well over six hundred do.  And from containing 
nary a penny in investments at the time of their birth in the early 1990s, 
they now hold assets of more than half a trillion dollars.4  More remarkably, 
 
                                                                                                             
1Rebecca Knight, ETFs Forecast to Outpace the Rest of Market, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), 
Jan. 2, 2007, at 19 (citing David Haywood, ETF Trends & Outlook: Strategic Developments for 
Index, Semi-Active, and Active ETF Solutions, Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.frcnet.com/ 
FreeResearch/FRC/pdf/ FRC_Study_ETF_Executive%20Summary.pdf). 
2Deborah Brewster, The Wisdom of Innovation, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 23, 2007, at 9 
(quoting Jonathan Steinberg). 
3John Waggoner, Great Minds Don't Think Alike About Index Funds, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 16, 2007, at 4B (quoting John C. Bogle during an interview). 
4See Inv. Co. Inst., Exchange-Traded Fund Assets, December 2007, Jan. 30, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/etfs_12_07.html#TopOfPage [hereinafter ICI December 
2007 Report].  The combined assets of ETFs crossed the $500 billion threshold for the first time in 
August 2007.  Compare Inv. Co. Inst., Exchange-Traded Fund Assets, July 2007, Aug. 30, 2007, 
available at http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etfs_07_07.html#TopOfPage, with Inv. Co. Inst., 
Exchange-Traded Fund Assets, August 2007, Sept. 27, 2007, available at 
http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etfs_ 08_07.html#TopOfPage (showing total assets of ETFs of 
$507.112 billion in August 2007 and $488.827 billion in July 2007). 
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the vast majority of this explosive growth has occurred in just the past two 
years, during which time the number of ETFs has more than tripled, from 
201 to 629 funds, while their assets have more than doubled, from $296 
billion to $608 billion.5  The rapid rise of ETFs coincides with—and owes 
much to—the recent difficulties of their related investment instruments and 
chief competition, mutual funds.  Indeed, ETFs are natural successors to 
mutual funds, and their success is a positive market response to the 
shortcomings of mutual funds. 
The first ETF, created in 1993, was designed to operate very much 
like a mutual fund, with one critical difference.6  Whereas both mutual 
funds and ETFs provide investors with access to an array of underlying 
securities through a single investment, mutual funds may be bought and 
sold at a price calculated just once a day, after the close of business.  ETFs, 
on the other hand, and as their name suggests, can be traded on securities 
exchanges constantly while their prices are updated every few seconds 
throughout the business day.7  In this respect, the ETF is a sophisticated 
evolution of the mutual fund. 
In order to make possible this novel pricing mechanism, ETF 
sponsors index their funds to benchmarks—such as the Standard & Poor's 
500 Composite Stock Price Index (S&P 500)8—so that investors in an ETF 
can confirm that the price of the fund's shares at any given moment fairly 
equals the price of all the underlying securities in the fund's portfolio.  
Because a fund that merely tracks an existing index can be managed largely 
with algorithms and trading programs, as opposed to human discretion, the 
cost to run—and, accordingly, the price of investing in—these funds is 
 
                                                                                                             
5See ICI December 2007 Report, supra note 4; INV. CO. INST., 2007 MUTUAL FUND FACT 
BOOK 1, 8 (47th ed. 2007), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf [here-
inafter ICI FACT BOOK]. 
6Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Exchange Act Release No. IC-25258, 17 
C.F.R. § 270 (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/ic-25258.htm (discuss-
ing the operations of ETFs) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release]. 
7See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts (SPDRs) SPDR Trust, Series 1, Prospec-
tus, at 2-5 (Jan. 26, 2007), available at 
https://www.ssgafunds.com/fund_doc/fund_doc_20060523_ 
174046/SPDR_PROSPECTUS_2007.pdf [hereinafter SPDR Prospectus] (explaining the precise 
dynamics of the SPDR Trust, including a description of how SPDR shares are designed to track 
the value of stocks in the S&P 500 Index and are "listed for trading on the American Stock 
Exchange," and explaining that "[t]he Trust issues and redeems SPDRs only in specified large lots 
of 50,000 SPDRs or multiples thereof referred to as 'Creation Units'"); see also John Kimelman, 
Fresh Pricing Is a Draw for Exchange-Traded Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at 6.  
"Exchange-traded funds can be traded throughout the day at constantly updated prices, a feature 
that may have particular appeal to investors who are troubled by the trading practices at many 
mutual funds."  See Kimelman, at 6. 
8See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 2-5. 
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often quite low.  Intraday trading and cheap prices are just two of the 
appealing features of ETFs and account for the healthy, if unremarkable, 
growth of ETFs in their first decade of existence. 
In recent years, however, ETFs have enjoyed more explosive growth 
thanks to the fact that ETFs are, by design, immune from many of the 
vulnerabilities of mutual funds.9  ETFs began to soar following the mutual 
fund industry's recent unpleasantness, beginning in September 2003, with 
widespread regulatory investigations into questionable practices such as 
market timing, late trading, front running, unfair valuation, and so forth.10  
Although the mutual fund industry as a whole remains much larger than the 
ETF industry, ETFs are growing at a far faster pace.11  The continued 
development of ETFs will very much be a story of whether they 
successfully improve upon the performance, integrity, and popularity of 
mutual funds as both sets of funds compete for lucrative new sources of 
investment from a common pool of investors. 
Also fueling the boom of ETFs are several prominent financial 
economists who endorse the use of these funds and, in some cases, hold 
senior management positions with leading ETF sponsors.12  For instance, 
Robert Shiller, author of Irrational Exuberance, is a backer of the fund 
sponsor, Claymore MACROShares.13  His colleague at Yale University, 
David Swensen, who oversees the University's outperforming endowment, 
encourages the use of ETFs in his book, Unconventional Success.14  Jeremy 
Siegel, a professor at the Wharton School of Business and the author of 
Stocks for the Long Run, is an adviser to WisdomTree, an especially 
innovative ETF sponsor.15  Burton Malkiel, the Princeton University 
economics professor and author of the bestseller, A Random Walk Down 
Wall Street, is also an enthusiast of ETFs.16  The support and zeal of such 
 
                                                                                                             
9See Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.C. 
10See, e.g., ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 8; Mark Hulbert, Why Mutual Funds Can't 
Keep Prices Fresh, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at 7; Kimelman, supra note 7, at 6. 
11See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 10; ICI December 2007 Report, supra note 4. 
12See, e.g., John Authers, Exchange-Traded Funds Could Prove the Investment of Choice, 
Unless Simplicity is Abandoned in the Race for Innovation, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 11, 2006, 
at 24. 
13Id.; see also Press Release, Claymore MACROShares: A New Oil Investment Opportunity 
(Nov. 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.macromarkets.com/recent_news/articles/2006/11302006_ CMshares.pdf (explaining 
Shiller's role as the architect of Claymore MACROShares). 
14DAVID SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS 206, 336-37 (2005).   
15See Authers, supra note 12, at 24. 
16See John Authers, Index Prophets Part Ways on ETFs, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 3, 
2007, at 12.  Professor Malkiel remarks that he is a proponent of ETFs: "'I've been a fan of index 
funds since before index funds existed, so how could I not like ETFs?'"  Id. (quoting Professor 
Malkiel). 
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well-known financial experts have certainly encouraged the astonishing 
influx of both institutional and retail investment in ETFs. 
By many accounts, the flow of assets into ETFs is projected to con-
tinue rising—to more than $2 trillion—in the next few years.17  That 
forecast may increase dramatically, however, if ETF sponsors accomplish 
two of the industry's largest goals.  First, sponsors are attempting to 
persuade the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to approve 
several currently pending applications for a new species of actively 
managed ETF.18  If, as has already begun to happen, the SEC does so, 
actively managed versions of these funds could vault in popularity to 
challenge the hegemony of the $12 trillion mutual fund industry.19  Second, 
if ETF sponsors can convince administrators of 401(k) and other retirement 
accounts—which hold savings of $2.5 trillion20—to adopt widespread use 
of ETFs in their menu of investment options, as is also beginning to occur 
already,21 these innovative investment vehicles may experience additional, 
truly phenomenal expansion.22  Of course, with any success that fund 
sponsors enjoy in increasing their assets under management, any perils or 
shortcomings of these relatively untested investment funds will be 
magnified commensu-rately. 
When, from time to time, novel streams of financial speculation—
such as mutual funds, venture capital funds, private equity funds, and hedge 
funds—branch off the enormous river of U.S. investment capital, these new 
courses can take several decades to swell with popularity and establish a 
recognized path.  The speed and violence with which ETFs have burst forth, 
however, threatens an entirely new wave of unpredictability and volatility.  
Not every respected authority on investment funds finds this rapid 
emergence of ETFs encouraging.  John Bogle, who founded Vanguard and 
pioneered the use of index funds, for example, is a strenuous detractor.23  
 
                                                                                                             
17Julie Segal, Piggybacking on the ETF Boom, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 2007, at 
77.   
18Id. 
19See John Waggoner, A Half-Hidden Manager, USA TODAY, May 31, 2007, at 3B ("An 
ETF managed by Legg Mason's superstar Bill Miller or Fidelity's Will Danoff, for example, might 
become an instant hit."). 
20See Rebecca Knight, ETF Providers Take Aim at the Defined Contribution Market, FIN. 
TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 23, 2007, at 8. 
21See Janet Kidd Stewart, 401(k) Options Worth Looking Over, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 2007, 
at 7 (mentioning that "a handful of companies offer ETFs in their 401(k) plans" but "[t]hat number 
is expected to grow as more providers enter the market"). 
22See Knight, supra note 20, at 8. 
23See, e.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF COMMON SENSE INVESTING 164-75 
(2007).  Bogle writes: 
[T]he ETF is a trader to the cause of classic investing.  I urge intelligent investors 
to stay the course with proved strategy.  While I can't say that classic indexing is 
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Bogle and others fear that the largely untested ETFs suffer from intrinsic 
vulnerabilities that make them poor repositories of so much new 
investment.  
So sudden has been the success of ETFs that industry analysts and 
commentators have yet to conduct much of an examination into how these 
funds will perform in a volatile and declining market, or to debate the utility 
of any increase or decrease in the regulation of this industry by the SEC.  In 
fact, until recently, scholars have virtually ignored ETFs.24  By exploring 
the advantages and shortcomings of these funds, this article seeks to 
develop a descriptive and conceptual framework for a scholarly discussion 
of ETFs as they gain ever-greater prominence, for good or for ill, in the 
coming years.  In addition, this article explores some of the implications of 
the dramatic growth of ETFs, arguing that the mutual fund industry and its 
dramatic scandals both provided the impetus for the growth of the ETF 
industry and offer a vivid warning of the conflicts of interest and 
vulnerabilities that may come to afflict these funds as they continue to 
grow.25 
Part II of this article expands upon the development and structure of 
ETFs to explain precisely how they function.  ETFs offer the same 
possibility of immediate diversification that has contributed to the 
popularity of mutual funds, but they also boast an innovative pricing 
mechanism that allows ETF shares to be traded throughout the business day. 
 This pricing mechanism creates an arbitrage opportunity that both 
encourages liquidity in the market for ETF shares and ensures an alignment 
between the performance of a fund and its benchmark index.  At the same 
time, these unique internal dynamics present a challenge to the creation and 
operation of an actively managed ETF.  Because sponsors of ETFs, like 
their mutual fund counterparts, are compensated in large part by the amount 
of assets they manage, however, they have great financial incentives to 
                                                                                                             
the best strategy ever devised, your common sense should reassure you that the 
number of strategies that are worse is infinite. 
Id. at 174. 
24One of the few law review articles discussing ETFs appears in a student note published 
in 2004, prior to the industry's recent surge in growth.  See Peter N. Hall, Bucking the Trend: The 
Unsupportability of Index Providers' Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted Trading of 
Exchange Traded Funds, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (2004).  Outside of the arena of legal 
scholarship, financial and economic academics have published or posted a small number of articles 
on the topic.  See, e.g., Beatrice Boehmer & Ekkehart Boehmer, Trading Your Neighbor's ETFs: 
Competition or Fragmentation?, Mar. 25, 2004, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=292128; 
James M. Poterba & John B. Shoven, Exchange Traded Funds: A New Investment Option for 
Taxable Investors (MIT Dep't of Econ. Working Paper No. 02-07, Nov. 26, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 302889. 
25For an analysis of the mutual fund industry and the recent allegations of malfeasance 
against investment advisers of those funds, see William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An 
Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401 (2006). 
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solve this challenge.  This section of the article concludes with an 
examination of the regulatory regime that currently governs ETFs. 
 
Part III discusses the positive attributes of ETFs that have made them 
such an attractive investment for hedge funds, institutions, and retail 
investors.  That section focuses on their trading flexibility, efficient opera-
tion and tax advantages, and the variety of their offerings in stocks, bonds, 
currencies, commodities, and other unusual investments. 
Part IV considers some of the drawbacks of ETFs, including many of 
the potential problems that detractors fear will come to harm investors in 
less exuberant economic times.  The flexibility that comes with an ability to 
trade ETFs on securities exchanges also ensures that they carry brokerage 
fees, assessed with every purchase and sale, which make them particularly 
unattractive for anyone who invests in regular installments or through 
dollar-cost-averaging.  That is, the transaction costs of ETFs may make 
them unsuitable for some portion of the retirement account market. 
Part V examines how ETFs have emerged as a salubrious market 
response to the difficulties with mutual funds.  The novel internal dynamics 
of ETFs arm them with architectural protections from many of the inherent 
weaknesses of mutual funds.  Moreover, the emergence of an alternative 
market solution is preferable to the imposition of several new regulatory 
rules to try to correct the problems with mutual funds. 
Part VI explores the implications for growth in the ETF industry, 
particularly if fund sponsors ultimately succeed in developing ETFs that are 
attractive to defined contribution plans or are able to persuade the SEC to 
approve applications for actively managed ETFs.  The expansion of this 
new industry will almost surely not come without growing pains, and the 
experience of mutual fund advisers may provide useful lessons for the 
sponsors of exchange-traded funds.  In particular, the conflicts of interest 
that were such a source of weakness to mutual fund investment advisers 
may also prove to be the source of future difficulties for ETF sponsors and 
investors.  
 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF ETFS 
 
A.  The Creation of Exchange-Traded Funds and Mutual Funds 
 
On Friday, January 22, 1993, the first ETF commenced operations by 
issuing 150,000 shares to be traded upon the American Stock Exchange 
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(Amex).26  These shares, known as Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts 
(SPDRs, pronounced "spiders"), represented ownership interests in an 
investment trust which, in turn, held a portfolio of shares of common stock 
in all the companies in the S&P 500, in substantially the same proportion as 
the index.27  The fund had no affiliation with Standard & Poor's but, 
acknowledging the importance of the S&P 500 as a bellwether of the 
broader stock market, licensed the right to use the index's name and 
composition.28  Accordingly, any investor who purchased a SPDR would, in 
a single share, be invested in the entire S&P 500, and the value of that 
SPDR would fluctuate in accordance with the rise and fall of the S&P 500.29 
Seventy years earlier, Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) had 
created the first mutual fund—Massachusetts Investors Trust (MIT)—to 
provide a similar opportunity for individuals to invest in a broad swath of 
diverse securities through a single vehicle.30  MIT, like most mutual funds, 
solicited investments from shareholders in exchange for shares in the fund.  
Using those investment proceeds, the adviser of the fund, MFS, purchased a 
portfolio of underlying securities for the fund.  As with shares of ETFs, the 
price of shares in MIT appreciates or declines as the aggregate value of the 
fund's underlying portfolio rises or falls.31  The critical difference between 
an ETF and a mutual fund, however, is in their respective methods of 
pricing their fund shares. 
Mutual funds are priced just once each day, after the close of 
business.32  At that time, the fund's investment adviser calculates the value 
of the fund's portfolio by multiplying the number of shares of each of the 
securities it owns by the respective closing prices of those shares.  That 
aggregate product of the portfolio is then added to any cash or other assets 
owned by the fund, while liabilities—such as fees owed to the adviser or 
 
                                                                                                             
26See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 20. 
27See id. 
28For a complete analysis of the legal issues surrounding the licensing of intellectual 
property related to financial indices in the ETF industry, see Hall, supra note 24, at 1128.  Hall 
argues that "the index providers' practice of imposing licensing fees on secondary exchanges for 
ETFs is without support in market regulation law, trademark law, or economic policy."  Id. 
29See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 3 ("The value of SPDRs fluctuates in relation to 
changes in the value of the [S&P 500] Portfolio."). 
30See Massachusetts Investors Trust, Registration Statement (Form N-1A) § IV (Feb. 27, 
2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63091/000095015604000074/d604691. txt.  "MFS is 
America's oldest mutual fund organization.  MFS and its predecessor organizations have a history 
of money management dating from the founding of this fund in 1924."  Id. 
31See id. § II, app. C, Equity Securities. 
32See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 161 (2004) (describing the structure and internal operation of mutual funds as well 
as the incentives and conflicts of mutual fund managers and brokers). 
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other service providers—are subtracted.  The resulting sum is then divided 
by the total number of shares issued by the mutual fund to calculate the net 
asset value (NAV) of a single fund share.  Clearly, this computation is made 
much easier if one waits until the price of each portfolio security has ceased 
fluctuating for the day.33 
Although the companies that provide investment advice to mutual 
funds may appreciate the comparative administrative ease of calculating a 
price after the stock market closes, investors in the fund may not find the 
prospect so attractive.  For instance, if, shortly after the opening bell, a 
remarkable piece of bad news sends the market into a precipitous fall 
throughout the entire business day, a mutual fund investor can do no more 
than place a sell order and ride the price of the fund all the way down until 
the closing bell.  Conversely, a mutual fund investor must react with similar 
sloth to any good news.  In either case, mutual funds, by their very 
structure, stymie efforts to react expeditiously to dramatic changes in a 
market during a business day.34 
 
B.  The Pricing Mechanism 
 
Recognizing both the appeal of mutual funds as pools of diversified 
investments as well as their pricing limitations, an employee of the Amex, 
named Nathan Most, developed the mechanisms employed by the first 
ETF.35  With the development of SPDRs, Most sought to provide investors 
with an opportunity to invest in a diversified investment vehicle via shares 
that traded at accurate prices throughout the business day.36  To do so, he 
introduced creation units, large blocks of ETF shares (denominated in 
groups of 50,000 shares or greater) that an ETF issues and redeems to 
investors.37  Typically, only large institutional investors and brokerage 
houses are capable of buying and selling such wholesale bundles of 
investments, which may be worth several millions of dollars.  Indeed, to 
become eligible to trade directly with an ETF, an investor must enter into an 
agreement to become an "authorized participant" (AP) in the fund.38 
 
                                                                                                             
33For a complete discussion of the structure and dynamics of mutual funds, including a 
detailed description of the mutual fund pricing process, see Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1417-29. 
34See id. 
35See Obituaries, Nathan Most, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 12, 2005, at 57.  Most's 
obituary described him as "the inventor of the Exchange Traded Fund."  Id. 
36See id. 
37See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 4; see also Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, 
pt. I.B (defining ETFs and explaining that they are only sold and redeemed in very large 
quantities). 
38See Ian Salisbury, Investing in Funds: A Monthly Analysis—Exchange-Traded Funds: 
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Unlike mutual funds, ETFs do not sell and buy their creation units for 
cash; instead, they require that these large institutional APs barter in-kind 
baskets of portfolio securities in exchange for the creation units.  Any AP 
wishing to acquire a creation unit must therefore provide a "portfolio 
deposit" equal in value to the NAV of all the ETF shares contained in the 
creation unit.  Before the market opens each day, the investment adviser or 
sponsor of each ETF will declare the contents of the portfolio deposit, 
which will largely replicate in microcosm the composition of the ETF's 
overall portfolio.  In order to purchase a creation unit of SPDRs, for 
instance, an AP would need to provide a portfolio deposit consisting of a 
representative collection of investments in the S&P 500.39 
The transaction is reversed when an AP wishes to redeem ETF 
shares. The AP must assemble the ETF shares into creation units and then 
present them, bundled accordingly, to the fund in exchange for a 
"redemption basket" of the fund's underlying portfolio securities.40  Thus, 
cash does not generally change hands in the purchase and sale of ETF 
shares between the fund and the largest investors—the APs—directly in 
privity with the fund. 
But why would anyone choose to exchange perfectly good S&P 500 
securities for a synthetic approximation thereof?  One reason an 
institutional investor might do so would be to profit from a subsequent sale 
to smaller investors who do not have the wherewithal to purchase such a 
broad and expensive array of investments.  Indeed, once institutional APs 
purchase blocks of ETF shares in these initial transactions with ETFs, they 
may then resell them on a securities exchange in a secondary transaction to 
retail investors.  For this service, large investors such as brokerage houses 
can charge retail investors a transaction fee.41 
For the retail investors, the shares in an ETF may, operationally, 
behave in ways similar to shares of an operating company.  For instance, 
although it is possible for an investor to purchase shares of General Motors 
(GM) directly from the company through an initial public offering, an 
individual investor is far more likely to acquire and dispose of those GM 
shares at negotiated prices in transactions with other GM investors on a 
stock exchange.  The investor will also pay brokerage fees for those 
transactions. 
                                                                                                             
Behind all the ETF Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2007, at R7 (noting that "there are 55 
authorized participants across the ETF industry, including brokerage dealers like those of Goldman 
Sachs and Merrill Lynch & Co. and specialists like Kellogg Group LLC and Susquehanna 
International Group LLP"). 
39See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 4; see also Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, 
at pt. II.B. 
40See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 4. 
41Id. 
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Note that not every ETF replicates the exact composition of its 
benchmark index.42  Instead, a fund sponsor may attempt to track the index 
using only a representative sample of the securities in that index.43  If, for 
instance, a hundred stocks account for the overwhelming majority of the 
performance of the S&P 500, an ETF tracking that index might more 
efficiently attain its goals by trafficking in just that subset of securities.  
These "sampling strategies" may provide the ETF with greater flexibility 
and cost-effectiveness, though perhaps at the cost of perfect accuracy.44 
 
C.  The Utility of Arbitrage 
 
The reciprocal treatment by ETFs of these two separate but parallel 
currencies—ETF shares and the baskets of underlying index securities—
creates an arbitrage opportunity for the institutional investors who trade in 
these investments.  If, for example, an AP can pay less for 50,000 SPDRs 
trading on a stock exchange to assemble a creation unit than to acquire all 
the underlying S&P 500 stocks required in a portfolio deposit, then the AP 
can make a quick profit by buying the 50,000 SPDRs, redeeming them with 
the fund in exchange for a redemption basket of S&P 500 shares, and then 
selling those S&P 500 securities on a stock exchange for cash.  Conversely, 
if the S&P 500 stocks are trading at prices lower than the SPDRs, the AP 
can make a similarly quick profit by purchasing the S&P 500 stocks 
required for a portfolio deposit, trading them to the ETF for a creation unit, 
and then selling the 50,000 ETF shares contained in that creation unit on a 
 
                                                                                                             
42Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.A.  Note also that not all ETFs track indices 
that are weighted according to market capitalization.  Many of the most innovative ETF sponsors 
are launching funds "based on indices that weight companies by fundamental factors such as 
dividends and earnings."  Brewster, supra note 2, at 9.  The philosophy of this so-called 
"fundamentalist" approach to indexing is: 
simply that over the long term, companies that pay dividends outperform 
companies that do not.  Therefore, an index based on dividend-paying companies 
will outperform the S&P 500, which is weighed by the value of a company's 
shares.  It believes that indices weighted by market capitalization tend to 
overweight overvalued companies and underweight the under-valued ones. 
Id. 
43Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.A. 
44See, e.g., Simon Hildrey, On the Trail of Exchange Traded Funds, FIN. TIMES 
(LONDON), Aug. 13, 2007, at 5; see also Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.A.  The 
Financial Times reports: 
An ETF may opt for full or partial replication . . . . [U]nder full replication, all the 
stocks in the index are held by the ETF. . . . Partial replication is used for a large 
index such as MSCI World, in which an ETF may hold 60 to 70 per cent of the 
stocks. . . . [T]his succeeds in reducing trading costs but means the performance 
of the ETF may not fully match that of the underlying index. 
See Hildrey, supra, at 5. 
2008] THE FORTUNES AND FOIBLES OF EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS 81 
 
stock exchange for a higher price.45 
This potential for arbitrage provides institutional investors and 
brokerage houses with a second incentive to provide liquidity to the ETF 
market by purchasing and reselling ETF shares to retail investors.  As we 
have already seen, brokerage houses may charge transaction fees with each 
purchase and sale of ETF shares, which also explains their presence in this 
market. 
But, perhaps most important for the success of ETFs, this arbitrage 
mechanism places pressure on the pricing of ETF shares to track the 
underlying index to which an ETF is benchmarked.  An arbitrageur who 
spies and attempts to exploit a deviation between the ETF and its 
underlying index will, through the pressure created by the supply or demand 
of buying or selling securities on open exchanges, force the two investments 
back into line with one another.  Historically, this pricing mechanism has 
succeeded in ensuring that ETF shares do not trade at significant premiums 
or discounts to their underlying indices.46  Most retail investors who do not 
intend to arbitrage ETF shares acquire ETFs in order to replicate as closely 
as possible these market indices.  Therefore, the ability of arbitrage to 
ensure that an ETF accurately tracks its benchmark is of extreme 
importance. 
 
D.  Passive Indexing Strategies 
 
A key component of the pricing and arbitrage mechanism of ETFs is 
transparency.  In order for any ETF investor—whether arbitrageur or retail 
purchaser—to evaluate the accuracy of the price of ETF shares, the 
composition of the ETF must be known publicly.  That is, only by 
comparing ETF shares to the corresponding prices of the underlying 
portfolio securities that the ETF holds can one ascertain whether the ETF 
shares are overpriced, underpriced, or accurately priced.  Accordingly, 
sponsors of ETFs publicly link their funds to established benchmarks, such 
as the S&P 500.47  Every potential investor in SPDRs knows that the ETF is 
attempting to replicate the performance and price of the S&P 500 stocks and 
can evaluate the performance of the ETF on those terms. 
 
                                                                                                             
45See SPDR Prospectus, supra note 7, at 1-4. 
46See, e.g., id. at 9 (providing a chart that illustrates the very similar performance of SPDR 
Trust shares and the underlying S&P 500 Index). 
47See Waggoner, supra note 19, at 3B.  "For it all to work, big investors must be able to 
calculate the value of the underlying stocks.  ETFs typically show the value per share of their 
holdings every 15 seconds.  Large investors can quickly see whether it would be profitable to trade 
ETF shares for the underlying stocks."  Id. 
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In the development of the ETF industry, the first funds linked 
themselves to the broadest and most well-known benchmarks available in 
the capital markets, such as the S&P 500, as we have seen, as well as the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Nasdaq-100 index, the Russell 3000, and 
the Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index.48  But as the popularity of ETFs has 
grown and the industry has saturated the most obvious benchmarks, 
sponsors have increasingly begun to launch funds that track even more 
arcane and narrow indices in niche sectors of the economy.  In addition, 
ETFs have expanded beyond indices of common equity securities to track 
preferred shares, bonds, currencies, commodities, and futures.49  Today, 
with over 500 different ETFs on the market, investors can use ETFs to 
invest in the economy of Malaysia,50 the Swedish Krona,51 companies that 
specialize in metabolic-endocrine disorders,52 and more. 
 
E.  Challenges of Active Management 
 
The chief limitation of an index-based ETF—no matter how 
specialized its index may be—is its ironbound connection to the index.  
Even though active human management of a fund may be more expensive 
than purely automated, passive investment programs, investors may 
appreciate the timely intervention of a thinking and experienced portfolio 
manager.  So while an ETF indexed to residential real estate investment 
trusts (REITs), for instance, must necessarily endure the woes associated 
with subprime mortgages, the human portfolio manager of a mutual fund 
operating in the same area could conceivably take steps to reduce the 
mutual fund's exposure by, at a minimum, converting a significant portion 
of the fund to cash.  The ETF would necessarily ride the financial 
 
                                                                                                             
48See Tom Lauricella et al., Does this Innovation Make Sense?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2007, 
at R1 (discussing the array of "broad-market ETFs"). 
49See, e.g., Kazuhiro Shimamura, Tokyo Stock Exchange Chases ETF Action—Commodity-
Based Funds Among Those Under Study, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2007, at C13; see also Henry 
Smith, Smart Ways of Tracking Over the Shorter Term, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 2, 2007, at 12 
(discussing the use of securities lending as a means of enhancing investment performance); John 
Spence, Move Over ETFs, as ETNs Hit the Scene, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2007, at C17 (discussing 
the creation of exchange-traded notes (ETNs) and their relative merits and limitations in 
comparison to ETFs that also track currencies). 
50iShares MSCI Malaysia Index Fund, Prospectus, at 25-27 (Jan. 1, 2007), available at  
http://www.ishares.com/material_download.jhtml?relativePath=/repository/material/download
s/ prospectus/ishares_inc_row.pdf&. 
51CurrencyShares Swedish Krona Trust, Prospectus, at 23-26 (June 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.currencyshares.com/content/pdf/FXS-Prosp.pdf. 
52HealthShares Metabolic-Endocrine Disorders Exchange-Traded Fund, Prospectus, at 91-
96 (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.healthsharesinc.com/product/download_pdf/588. 
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difficulties down in value, while the mutual fund could mitigate its losses. 
Beyond the perceived advantages of human discretion demonstrated 
by this example, active management also greatly expands the possible range 
of investment strategies for funds.  Because active management allows a 
fund to be directed according to the investing philosophy of an individual 
portfolio manager, there could, in theory, be as many different funds as 
there are personal and idiosyncratic fund managers.  The expansiveness of 
active management may account in part for the fact that American markets 
feature approximately 500 ETFs, which currently cannot be managed 
actively, but over 8,000 mutual funds, which can.53 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, ETF sponsors are attempting to 
devise—and to secure SEC approval for—actively managed ETFs.  
Multiple sponsors have filed applications with the SEC to launch actively 
managed ETFs,54 and some industry analysts believe the SEC will soon 
approve their use.  Any sponsor hoping to create such an actively managed 
ETF faces an inherent technical challenge, however, which the SEC has 
been brooding over for many years.  In fact, in 2001, the SEC published a 
concept release soliciting suggestions on how to solve the central dilemma 
of active management: the need to reconcile a portfolio manager's desire to 
maintain secrecy over his or her investment strategy (which is, after all, the 
service for which customers pay the manager) with potential investors' 
demand for information necessary to evaluate the accuracy of the fund's 
share price.55  After all, if investors do not know the composition of an 
actively managed ETF, they cannot determine whether the trading price of 
the fund's shares is fair.  If, on the other hand, the manager publicizes his or 
her holdings and strategy, what is to prevent other managers—or the 
investors themselves—from simply replicating the strategy without paying 
the portfolio manager? 
In its currently pending application for actively managed Treasury 
ETFs, one sponsor—Vanguard—has proposed a "sampling technique that 
involves generating a basket of deposit securities that duplicates 40% to 
50% of the securities held in the investment portfolios."56  Relying upon the 
 
                                                                                                             
53See generally Carla Fried, Exchange-Traded Funds, in a Rainbow of Choices, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 23 ("After all, it's not lost on marketers that more than 80 percent of 
investor money still goes to actively managed mutual funds."). 
54Bear Stearns and Vanguard have both filed applications for actively managed ETFs.  See 
Thao Hua, Bear Stearns could land 1st active ETF on U.S. shores, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, 
Apr. 30, 2007, http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070430/PRINTSUB/7042 
7058/1031/TOC. 
55Exchange Act Release, supra note 6 (evaluating the background of ETFs as well as the 
SEC's analysis of possible benefits and detriments of permitting actively managed ETFs). 
56Diya Gullapalli, Moving the Market: Vanguard Makes Second Filing for "Actively 
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liquidity of Treasurys, Vanguard asserts that the risk of such a fund's shares 
trading at greater premiums and discounts than passively managed ETFs is 
"only theoretical and unlikely to be realized given the predominantly 'plain 
vanilla' portfolio holdings."57 
 
F.  Fund Sponsors 
 
Given the similarities between mutual funds and ETFs, one might 
expect the sponsors of the newer ETFs to be well-established investment 
advisers of mutual funds.  In fact, the two largest ETF sponsors—Barclays 
Global Investors and State Street Global Advisors58—are relatively minor 
players in the mutual fund arena.  Vanguard, one of the preeminent mutual 
fund advisers, has moved into third place in the ETF business, but only after 
something of a late start.59  Because ETFs attract many of the same 
investors as mutual funds, mutual fund advisers may have initially 
considered them a threat or a product that would simply cannibalize existing 
customers.  But as ETFs have grown ever larger, they have become an 
increasingly attractive business proposition to many mutual fund investment 
advisers. 
Perhaps because the business entities that create, establish, and 
oversee ETFs do not actually provide investment advice to the funds—
rather, computer algorithms direct the buying and selling of fund shares in 
accordance with funds' benchmark indices—they are known in the business 
as "sponsors," not advisers.  But, although management fees for these 
passively managed funds are, on average, lower than actively managed 
mutual funds, the ETF business is hardly a nonprofit enterprise.  On the 
contrary, the ETF business has proven extremely lucrative to Barclays and 
State Street, whose management fees are applied to hundreds of billions of 
dollars in assets under management.  Multiplying one estimate of the 
industry's average fee of 52 basis points, or 0.52%, by the total assets in 
ETFs of approximately half a trillion dollars, we can estimate that the ETF 
industry generates more than $2.5 billion in annual management fees for 
fund sponsors.60  Given the industry's relatively low fees, however, sponsors 
must operate large funds in order to realize material profits, which explains 
                                                                                                             
Managed" ETFs, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at C3. 
57Id. 
58See Tom Lauricella, Fund Fight: State Street Aims to Reclaim its Past ETF Glory, WALL 
ST. J., July 3, 2007, at R1 (discussing the competition between the two largest ETF sponsors, as 
well as the third-place ETF provider, Vanguard Group). 
59Id. 
60See Eleanor Laise, Before You Drive that Hot ETF . . .; They're Spiffy and Alluring, But 
an Owner's Manual is Essential for Novices, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2007, at R1 (citing a Morgan 
Stanley estimate of the average expense ratio for a U.S. stock ETF). 
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the significant first-mover advantage of Barclays and State Street.61  This 
phenomenon may also explain why smaller ETF sponsors are attempting to 
acquire permission for actively managed funds, whose comparatively higher 
fees would allow sponsors to realize profits without having to acquire such 
a large market share. 
But management fees are not the only source of revenue for ETF 
sponsors.  With the portfolio deposits they receive from investors, ETFs 
accumulate enormous reserves of portfolio securities.  Sponsors can lend 
these securities to other actors in the capital markets for a fee.  Any investor 
who wishes to sell a security short, for instance, will need to borrow shares 
initially before replacing them at the conclusion of the short-sale 
transaction. The fees from these lending programs can be—and often are—
used to boost the performance of the ETF or to compensate the sponsor, 
depending on the terms of the ETF's underlying trust.62 
On the other side of the ledger, ETF sponsors may be responsible for 
discharging the expenses associated with operating a fund.  To do so, they 
typically use management fees to pay "the cost of transfer agency, custody, 
fund administration, legal, and other services."63 
 
G.  State and Federal Regulation 
 
ETFs are typically organized as business or statutory trusts under the 
state laws of Massachusetts, New York, or Delaware,64 and then are 
registered as investment companies under the federal securities laws.65  The 
Investment Company Act of 194066 does not expressly contemplate ETFs, 
 
                                                                                                             
61See Smith, supra note 49, at 12. 
62Id. 
63Id. 
64In contrast, the mutual fund industry, which has historically and predominantly used 
Massachusetts business trusts as the business entity of choice, the ETF industry prefers to use 
Delaware statutory trusts for new funds.  See Telephone Interview with Robert J. Borzone, Jr., 
Partner, Ropes & Gray LLP, in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct. 22, 2007). 
65See Shefali Anand, When an ETF is Not an ETF; Legal Structures and Regulators Can 
Vary, While Tax Implications May Not Be Clear, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at B1.  The Wall 
Street Journal reported: 
The typical stock ETFs are set up under the same law as mutual funds—the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, which has several requirements meant to 
protect individual investors. 
 
For instance, each fund or ETF must have a board with a majority of independent 
directors, whose job is to watch over the fund's adviser on behalf of investors in 
the fund. 
Id. 
66Pub. L. No. 768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64) 
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so many ETF sponsors create their funds as either open-end funds or unit 
investment trusts.67  In order to depart from the standard mutual fund 
structure and to offer their distinctive feature of intraday pricing, ETF 
sponsors first must obtain a variety of statutory exemptions from the SEC 
for their funds.68 
                                                                                                             
[hereinafter Company Act]. The Investment Company Act is often referred to as simply the 
Company Act or the 1940 Act. 
67See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 
Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
68See Diya Gullapalli, SEC to Hasten Process to Clear ETF Approvals, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 11, 2006, at C7 (discussing the SEC approval process and exemptive orders required by ETF 
sponsors prior to launching a new fund). 
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Normally, for instance, an investment company such as a mutual fund 
is not permitted to redeem its shares only in wholesale blocks and must 
instead redeem any amount of fund shares presented to the fund by an 
investor.69  In order for ETFs to use creation units, therefore, they must 
receive exemptive regulatory relief from the SEC.  Similarly, an investment 
company's shares are usually bought and sold only in transactions between 
the company—typically, a mutual fund—and any individual or entity 
wishing to invest in the fund.70  Thus, once again, an ETF must obtain 
permission from the SEC in order to arrange for its shares to be traded on a 
secondary stock exchange, such as Amex or NASDAQ.  In addition, ETFs 
also require permission to waive the requirement of providing every 
individual purchaser of fund shares on those secondary exchanges with a 
prospectus detailing the operation, risks, fees, and minutiae of the fund, as 
is typically required when a mutual fund sells shares to an investor.71 
By compiling this battery of regulatory exemptions, ETF sponsors 
have carved out the regulatory space their funds need in order to offer 
intraday pricing, and the SEC has willingly acceded to their requests.  In 
order to offer active management of ETFs, however, sponsors will require 
additional exemptive relief, which the SEC has not yet seen fit to grant, 
notwithstanding the Commission's having spent at least six years 
considering the request nor expert predictions of imminent approval. 
 
III.  POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES OF ETFS 
 
ETFs have burst onto the investing scene in just a few short years for 
a variety of good reasons.  Not only do they provide a similar degree of 
access to investment diversification, they do so at competitive prices and 
with the added benefit of intraday trading. 
 
A.  Flexibility and Exchange Trading 
 
Perhaps the most immediately striking characteristic of ETFs is their 
eponymous innovation: the ability to trade like a typical security throughout 
the business day at real-time prices on a stock exchange.  Prior to the advent 
of ETFs, an investor seeking broad market or sector diversification via a 
single investment instrument would be limited to mutual funds, which are 
priced just once a day.72 
 
                                                                                                             
69See Company Act, supra note 66, § 11.  
70See id. 
71See id. 
72Closed-end mutual funds also trade on stock exchanges and therefore require similar 
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The limits of mutual funds' system of "forward pricing," as it is 
known, are manifest.73  Investors in mutual funds have no way of reacting to 
positive or negative news during the business day.  So, if shortly after the 
opening bell, for example, the Federal Reserve were to unexpectedly lower 
the federal funds rate on overnight loans between banks, thereby triggering 
an immediate and sustained rise in the broader stock market, mutual fund 
investors would be unable to participate in any general and sustained rise.  
Instead, they would be forced to wait until the close of business that day to 
purchase any shares in a mutual fund, at which point the gains would very 
likely have already been incorporated into the price of the fund's shares.74 
Conversely, if shortly after the opening bell, an earthquake were to 
strike a major financial center, sending national and global markets into a 
sustained decline, anyone invested in broad-based mutual funds would once 
again be compelled to wait until the close of business to sell.  Of course, by 
that time, the shares of the mutual fund would have already sustained the 
losses precipitated by the negative news and it would be too late for an 
investor in those funds to avoid the decline.75 
With ETFs, however, investors can react immediately to positive or 
negative news by purchasing or selling ETF shares as soon as they receive 
the information.  Setting aside any limitations suggested by the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis upon anyone's possibility of beating the market 
in such circumstances,76 a savvy and responsive ETF investor may be able 
to profit from rises or to avoid declines in the market through swift ETF 
transactions.77  A SPDR will, for the most part, react to positive or negative 
financial developments in just the same manner as the broader S&P 500, 
providing intraday exposure to market fluctuations. 
ETF shares resemble stocks and provide flexibility to investors in 
other ways as well.  Investors can, for example, place market, stop, or limit 
orders on ETF shares, thereby exerting a good deal of precise control over 
the purchases and dispositions of the holdings in their portfolios.  In the 
same way, investors may also sell ETF shares short in order to bet against 
the movements of broad market indices or to hedge against the performance 
of other holdings in their portfolios.78  Similarly, investors may purchase 
                                                                                                             
exemptive relief from the SEC. 
73See Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1420-21. 
74See id. 
75See id. 
76See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to 
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 657 (2003) (providing a description of an ETF transaction). 
77See Ruth Sullivan, ETFs Increase in Popularity, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 20, 2007, 
at 2 ("The number of institutional investors worldwide using exchange traded funds listed on 
international exchanges has increased significantly in the past year."). 
78Id. 
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ETF shares on margin and buy or sell options on ETF shares.79 
 
B.  The Array of Investment Options 
 
The flexibility of ETF shares allows both institutional and retail 
investors to use these funds in the construction of sophisticated and varied 
portfolios.80 
Because of the intraday pricing feature of ETFs, investors obviously 
may use ETF shares to time market movements in order to bet on upward or 
downward swings in stock exchanges.  Similarly, institutional investors 
holding uninvested cash during periods between investment activities—
such as private equity funds that have received but not yet invested the 
funds of their limited partners—may choose to equitize that cash by using 
ETF shares to invest the funds in broad market indices for short periods of 
time.81 
Moreover, the expanding array of ETFs provides ETF investors with 
access not only to broad swaths of the marketplace, providing very easy 
diversification, but also to exotic underlying investments that might 
otherwise be inaccessible to relatively unsophisticated investors.82  For 
example, ETFs now provide exposure to derivatives, futures,83 commodi-
ties,84 currencies,85 and preferred stock.86  Many retail investors may have 
no other means of participating in such investments.87 
 
                                                                                                             
79See Exchange Act Release, supra note 6, pt. II.C. 
80See Sullivan, supra note 77, at 2.  Deborah Fuhr, a managing director at Morgan Stanley, 
states: "[ETFs] are seen as offering low-cost beta and a good selection of exposure to international 
and emerging market indices.  They are also liquid and easy to understand."  Id. 
81See Smith, supra note 49, at 12 ("ETFs are used by transition managers for equitising 
cash or as short-term investment vehicles.  And traders make use of ETFs for hedging their 
investments in illiquid asset classes."). 
82For a discussion of the range and narrow focus of some recently launched ETFs, see Rob 
Carrick, ETFs for Everyone, GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 23, 2007, at B15 (discussing funds that 
specialize in preferred shares, down markets, valuable patents, and more). 
83See Smith, supra note 49, at 12 ("Like futures, ETFs trade in real time and can be 
shorted. Unlike futures, they don't have maturities to be rolled over or margin requirements to be 
taken care of."). 
84See, e.g., Shimamura, supra note 49, at C13 (discussing the creation of ETFs, such as 
"the $1.4 billion Franklin Gold & Precious Metals Fund," which tracks the value of gold). 
85ETF sponsors have created a new and related investment product, called "exchange-
traded notes," which specialize in currency speculation.  See Spence, supra note 49, at C17 
(discussing the creation of ETNs and their relative merits and limitations in comparison to ETFs 
that also track currencies). 
86See Shimamura, supra note 49, at C13 (discussing the growing popularity of ETFs in 
Japan, which has led to the launch of ETFs on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Asia's largest). 
87ETF sponsors may develop more funds that behave like the so-called "lifecycle funds" in 
the mutual fund industry.  See, e.g., Jeff D. Opdyke, Target-Date Funds Shake Up the Mix, WALL 
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An investor may therefore easily use ETFs to construct a core-and-
satellite portfolio, purchasing passive and broad-based ETFs in a diverse 
pattern of asset allocation as the portfolio's core, while choosing more 
specialized, niche ETFs as satellites in an effort to boost the portfolio's 
performance.88 
 
C.  Efficiency and Costs 
 
Because of the nature of their structure and management, ETFs 
generally charge low fees and expense ratios, which further endear them to 
investors.89  ETFs that passively track broad market indices have relatively 
little need for management by human portfolio managers.  In fact, the 
composition of indices often remains unchanged for long periods, typically 
varying only on those rare occasions when the index adds or removes a 
stock.  Accordingly, ETFs suffer very few of the transaction costs 
associated with the turnover of portfolio securities, which is not the case 
with mutual funds, particularly when such funds are actively managed. 
In addition, ETFs do not conduct anything close to the number of 
transactions with retail investors that mutual funds do.90  Mutual funds must 
process all the purchases and redemptions of every single investor in their 
fund, large or small; those transactions generate significant costs associated 
with shareholder recordkeeping and managing accounts.  ETFs, on the other 
hand, conduct far fewer large scale transactions, with investors wealthy and 
sophisticated enough to traffic in creation units, portfolio deposits, and 
redemption baskets.  All other transactions involving ETF shares take place 
on secondary stock exchanges and, therefore, do not generate expenses that 
                                                                                                             
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2007, at D1.  The Wall Street Journal reported: 
Target-date funds, also known as lifecycle funds, hold an ever-changing mix of 
other stock and bond funds with the goal of serving as the only investment an 
employee needs in a 401(k) plan.  The closer the employee gets to retirement age, 
the more conservative the fund's investments become, in theory locking in the 
gains from an earlier, riskier mix of holdings in the fund. 
Id. 
88See Eleanor Laise, The Risks of Betting Big on ETFs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2007, at B1 
(discussing how investors can construct an entire portfolio comprising only of ETFs). 
89ETF fees are low in part because the costs to run an ETF are low, but also because ETF 
sponsors compete aggressively for certain fund investors.  See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli, ETF Price 
War Looms as Vanguard Looks to Catch Up—New Product Takes Aim at Big Barclays Fund, 
WALL ST. J., July 7, 2007, at B1.  The Wall Street Journal reported: 
In coming weeks, Vanguard Group plans to roll out an ETF designed to directly 
undercut one of the biggest products on the market, from rival Barclays Global 
Investors, a unit of Barclays PLC. . . . The Vanguard fund will have an expense 
ratio of 0.15%, which is less than half the cost of the BGI fund. 
Id. 
90See generally Karen Damato, For Index Funds, the Devil is in the Detail, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 7, 2004, at C1 (discussing fees, expenses, and cash-drag on mutual funds and ETFs). 
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the fund must bear.  Of course, those secondary transactions do involve 
brokerage fees for investors, which is a cost of buying and selling ETF 
shares not captured in the funds' expense ratios. 
An investor who wishes to construct a long-term investment portfolio 
from a large lump sum of savings can do so extremely cheaply and 
efficiently with the purchase of relatively few ETFs.  By acquiring 
substantial amounts of enough ETF shares to satisfy the asset-allocation 
requirements of sound portfolio theory, an investor might avoid iterative 
brokerage fees and then take full advantage of the low management fees of 
ETFs, which are, on average, lower than the expense ratios of mutual 
funds.91 
Each mutual fund and ETF will experience difficulty realizing an 
identical or superior return compared to its benchmark index because, 
unlike a theoretical index, real funds incur practical management and 
operational costs that impose a drag on the funds' performance.  ETFs 
possess two attributes that enable them to offset some of this drag and to 
boost their efficiency with respect to their underlying indices.  First, unlike 
benchmarks, ETFs can charge fees from lending their portfolio securities to 
other market participants who would like to use those securities to, for 
instance, engage in short-sale transactions.  Second, in comparison to 
mutual funds, ETFs can operate with far lower cash reserves on hand.  
Mutual funds typically maintain a significant cash reserve of up to 5% to 
use in redeeming any investor who wishes to sell shares back to the fund.  
As we have seen, however, ETFs do not redeem their shareholders in cash 
but, rather, in-kind through redemption baskets of portfolio securities.  Any 
fund that is more fully invested will experience less "cash-drag," which 
gives another performance advantage to ETFs over mutual funds.92 
 
D.  The Tax Advantage 
 
The pricing mechanism of ETFs not only allows for intraday trading 
of fund shares, but also has the added benefit of providing shareholders with 
extremely favorable tax treatment.93  To appreciate this tax advantage, first 
consider the operations of a typical mutual fund: a mutual fund purchases 
portfolio securities using the cash new investors pay into the fund, and then 
 
                                                                                                             
91See id.  
92See id. 
93See Sara Robinson, Amex Considers Mutual Fund Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, 
at B8.  "Exchange-traded funds are inherently tax-efficient.  Because they create and redeem their 
shares through the exchange of stock, rather than cash, they avoid distributing capital gains to 
shareholders."  Id. 
92 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 33 
 
sells those securities either to pursue a particular investment strategy or to 
redeem shareholders who wish to leave the fund.  To the extent that the 
value of portfolio securities have appreciated in value while owned by the 
fund, these transactions are clearly realization events that may generate 
considerable capital gains liabilities for the fund, which in turn distributes 
those costs to shareholders of the fund.94 
An ETF, on the other hand, grows primarily through the accretion of 
in-kind portfolio deposits of underlying securities from investing 
shareholders and then redeems those shareholders by returning securities in 
redemption baskets.  Unlike mutual funds, ETFs will rarely, if ever, alter 
investment strategies and therefore, will rarely require direct purchases or 
sales of portfolio securities.95  To the extent that any of the securities 
contributed by investors to an ETF have significantly appreciated while 
owned by the fund, the fund can prioritize the redemption of its securities to 
rid itself of those with the highest potential unrealized capital gains first.  
Then, if an ETF is for some reason obliged to sell any securities, its tax 
liabilities will be minimized to the greatest extent possible.  Accordingly, 
ETFs incur comparatively few taxable purchases and sales of securities and, 
in turn, pass fewer capital gains liabilities on to their shareholders.96 
 
IV.  LIMITATIONS OF ETFS 
 
As the extraordinary growth of ETFs demonstrates, a great swath of 
the investing public has been largely persuaded of the many compelling 
attributes of ETFs.  But not everyone is convinced.  As ETFs have gained 
greater prominence, investing experts such as John C. Bogle have begun to 
point out shortcomings with these funds.97  Moreover, as the rapid 
expansion of ETFs has begun to saturate the market, fund sponsors are 
launching increasingly exotic species of funds, the growth of which has 
prompted a fresh wave of criticism.98 
 
                                                                                                             
94See id.  
95See James J. Eccleston, Nothing Alien about ET Funds, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 8, 
1999, at 6.  "ETFs can satisfy redemptions by investors much more favorably than mutual funds by 
being able to transfer out securities in-kind to the redeeming investors."  Id. 
96See id. 
97See, e.g., Gullapalli, supra note 89, at B1.  "Mr. Bogle has voiced concern about trading 
costs and misuse of narrowly focused ETFs that don't track broad market swaths."  Id. 
98For an extensive discussion of the potential perils of investing in ETFs, see Laise, supra 
note 60, at R1 (discussing potentially cheaper investment options, layers of complex trading costs, 
potential investor confusion from the wide array of ETFs, tracking error, the lack of performance 
histories, and the unsuitability of some funds for small investors). 
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A.  Comparing the Total Performance of ETFs and Mutual Funds 
 
Although ETFs have quickly garnered a reputation as cost-effective 
investments, they are certainly not without fees and expenses of their own.99 
As we have seen, the sponsor of every ETF charges a management fee for 
running the fund.100  Although these fees are for the most part relatively 
low, they are not negligible for every ETF.  Indeed, some ETFs that 
specialize in rather unorthodox investments, such as illiquid fixed-income 
securities or extremely narrow sectors containing only a few issuers, may 
charge management fees of well over 100 basis points.101 
In addition, the fact that retail investors must buy and sell ETFs on 
exchanges means that those investors will have to pay brokerage fees.102  
Although brokerage fees can be amortized into relative insignificance if an 
investment is held for many years, such fees may impose a prohibitive 
expense on retirement accounts or commendable investment strategies such 
as dollar-cost averaging.103  Any type of savings strategy that involves 
purchasing a relatively small amount of investments at regular intervals may 
be incapable of overcoming the costs of ETF brokerage fees. 
Buying ETFs—or, indeed, any investment whose price is negotiated 
on an open exchange—also means that ETF investors bear the burden of 
absorbing costs that result from bid-and-ask spreads—that is, the "gaps 
between the price buyers are willing to pay and sellers are willing to 
accept."104  These spreads are typically exacerbated when the market 
undergoes unusual volatility and may be suffered most keenly by smaller or 
more specialized ETFs whose shares experience thin trading volume.105 
In some respects, discussions regarding the dynamics of ETF fees are 
needlessly abstract.  Particular factors—such as structure and 
management—certainly may explain how and why ETFs' fees are often 
lower than corresponding mutual funds.  And other factors—such as trading 
fees—may explain why the cost of ETF investing may be higher than one 
expects.  But surely only one consideration matters in the final analysis: the 
 
                                                                                                             
99See Gullapalli, supra note 89, at B1. 
100Id. 
101Smith, supra note 49, at 12. 
102John C. Bogle, "Value" Strategies, Commentary, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2007, at A11. 
103Id. 
104Diya Gullapalli, Challenge for ETF Trading: Bumpy Markets Gums It Up, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 4, 2007, at C1. 
105See id. (comparing the 1.6% average spread of "the tiny $3 million HealthShares 
Infectious Disease ETF" with the 0.02% average spread of "[s]ome of the biggest, most heavily 
traded ETFs, including Barclays Global Investors' $17 billion iShares S&P 500 ETF and $46 
billion iShares MSCI EAFE ETF" over the same time period). 
94 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 33 
 
empirical results of ETF performance. 
The Wall Street Journal recently commissioned Morningstar to 
conduct just such a study comparing the performance of some of the largest 
and most well-known ETFs with mutual funds offering similar investment 
strategies.  The report concluded: 
Big, low-cost index funds from Boston-based Fidelity Invest-
ments and Vanguard Group Inc., Malvern, Pa., outperformed 
the ETFs in most of the comparisons we set up.  For the 40 
time periods studied, the mutual funds prevailed in 34—
including a sweep of the one-, three-, and 10-year after-tax 
categories.106 
What may be more remarkable about these results is that the mutual funds 
outperformed the ETFs before taking into account the brokerage fees that 
investors must pay to buy and sell ETFs on stock exchanges—fees that are 
typically absent from mutual fund transactions.107 
With the panoply of structural advantages that allows ETFs to 
function with such operational efficiency and inherent tax advantages, how 
is it possible that they failed to outperform mutual funds?108  First, note that 
only the highest-performing mutual funds did better than ETFs.109  Those 
mutual funds are operated in ways very similar to ETFs; that is, they are 
linked to broad market indices and passively managed.110  Most mutual 
funds—which are actively managed—have expense ratios higher than the 
average ETF.111 
Second, as with ETFs, the investment advisers of mutual funds can 
also use strategies such as stock lending to boost their funds' performance 
and, moreover, "may have a greater incentive to try to earn back a portion 
of their expenses."112  Because ETFs are widely purchased by institutional 
investors attempting to hedge against the market,113 the sponsor of an ETF 
may believe that "outperformance of all other index funds can take a 
 
                                                                                                             
106Ian Salisbury, A Close Race, a Surprising Finish; Against Sleek ETF Rivals, Top Index 




110See Salisbury, supra note 106, at R1. 
111Id. ("ETFs do have low costs when judged against mutual funds across the board, many 
of which have higher expenses because they employ a staff of analysts to pick stocks."). 
112Id. 
113See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 77, at 2. 
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backseat to predictability of the return."114  Indeed, a spokeswoman for 
Barclays notes that "[o]utperforming the index is not going to do any good 
for short sellers."115 
Third, unlike ETFs, mutual funds can "buy[] stocks ahead of antici-
pated additions to their index."116  But, as a senior manager at State Street 
Global Advisors points out, aggressive mutual fund managers who adopt 
such techniques incur additional risk absent from ETFs in order to boost 
their performance.117  And "[w]hile tactical moves may improve results one 
year, they can just as easily backfire the next."118 
The surprise of this study is that the very best performing mutual 
funds can outperform ETFs.  But one of its other findings is that the 
average ETF with a given investment strategy outperforms the average 
correspond-ing mutual fund.119  Perhaps this conclusion suggests that while 
an informed investor may be able to do better than ETFs by selecting the 
very best mutual funds, the uninformed investor is more likely to find 
higher performance amongst typical ETFs than with typical mutual funds. 
 
B.  Short-Term Speculation 
 
What bothers John C. Bogle most about ETFs is the myopic and 
harmful investing behavior that he believes they encourage amongst 
investors.120  He concludes that "if long-term investing was the paradigm for 
the classic index [mutual] fund, trading ETFs can only be described as 
short-term speculation."121  The ability to trade a fund intraday is less a 
useful tool than a dangerous temptation to engage in day trading, he 
argues.122  More-over, trading has overtaken diversification as "the driving 
force in the ETF world," he insists, citing advertisements for SPDRs, that 
promised: "Now, you can trade the S&P 500 all day long, in real time."123 
Emotions, Bogle suspects, encourage "performance-chasing 
investors" to become their own worst enemies.124  Citing some of the higher 
performing funds of late, he states that the "annualized share turnover of 
 
                                                                                                             




118Salisbury, supra note 106, at R1. 
119Id. 




124Bogle, supra note 102, at A11. 
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these sectors averages an astonishing 2500%."125  Bogle does not explain 
what proportion of this turnover is attributable to the investment strategies 
of professional and institutional investors such as hedge funds and what 
proportion is attributable to the retail investors for whom he expresses 
concern. 
Overlooking the generality of his grievance, Bogle does helpfully 
point out this vulnerability for ETFs.  While mutual funds suffered from 
their architectural weaknesses (which permitted market timing, late trading, 
and other deleterious behavior), ETFs are also inherently at risk: the ability 
to trade ETFs all day long may tempt rapid and unsuccessful day trading by 
overly optimistic retail investors.126  Of course, the performance of 
investments in a mutual fund also can be—and has been—harmed by rapid 
trading. 
 
C.  Saturation and Niche Volatility 
 
As the number of ETFs on the market has ballooned in recent years, 
sponsors seeking to bring new funds to the market have been forced to 
choose whether to compete with well-established funds indexed to well-
known benchmarks or to offer more specialized funds that track 
increasingly narrow niche indices.  Although sponsors have done both, the 
increasing availability of myriad arcane and narrow funds has created the 
most consternation amongst industry observers.127  The Wall Street Journal 
reports: 
Critics have warned in recent months that ETF companies' 
efforts to distinguish themselves with new products have led to 
offerings that are too narrowly focused for most small 
 
                                                                                                             
125Id. 
126Bogle does concede that, when used appropriately, ETFs may perform just as well as 
broad-based index funds.  "In fairness, if they are not traded, they can often be the equal of the 
classic index funds."  Id. 
127See, e.g., Steven Syre, ETF Market Takes Off, but Wealth of Choices Makes Investors 
Wary, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 2007, at E1.  "'This is an industry that has had Miracle-Gro 
sprinkled on it in the past two years,' says James Lowell, publisher of the Forbes ETF Advisor, a 
newsletter for exchange traded fund investors.  'There are just too many products out there.'"  Id. 
See also Carrick, supra note 82, at B15.  Carrick reports: 
There's a growing sense that ETF providers are getting carried away with some of 
the new products they're introducing.  "They're using a 'throw it against the wall 
and see what sticks approach,'" said Tyler Mordy, head of research at Hahn 
Investment Stewards and editor of a publication called ETFocus.  "It's getting 
ridiculous." 
Id. 
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investors' purposes.  Many ETFs are praised for their broad 
diversifica-tion of holdings, but with more than 500 offerings 
today, the inexperienced can be tempted to play tiny niches, a 
potentially dangerous tactic.128 
Bogle also complains that these new funds contradict the benefits of diverse 
index investing.  "[S]urely holding small segments of the market offers less 
diversification and commensurately more risk," he observes.129 
The narrower a fund becomes, the fewer underlying securities may be 
available for inclusion in its portfolio.130  This lack of diversification can 
cause the ETF to behave more like an individual stock than like a mutual 
fund.  In a narrow sector, one particular operating company may account for 
a dominant market share, and therefore, its performance may impose a 
disproportionate impact on the returns of any ETF invested in that sector.  
Moreover, when only a few companies operate in a particular investment 
sector, ETFs and other investment funds attempting to invest in that sector 
may drive the price of those companies artificially higher, not because of 
faith in the value of any particular company, but simply because of the need 
to hold those shares in the fund.  Similarly, the creation of ETFs to track the 
value of commodities such as silver and gold has driven up the price of 
those holdings.131  The securities of esoteric investment niches, such as 
foreign issuers or micro-cap companies, are also more likely to be traded 
with only thin volume and are thus susceptible to the volatility of dramatic 
price swings.132 
 
                                                                                                             
128Diya Gullapalli, As ETFs Seek Niches, Risks Rise; Returns Are Often at the Top of the 
Performance Rankings—and the Bottom, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2007, at R1. 
129Bogle, supra note 102, at A11; see generally Authers, supra note 16, at 12 (quoting 
Bogle in a broader discussion of ETFs, who claims, "after all the selection challenges, the timing 
risks, the extra costs, and the added taxes, typical ETF investors have absolutely no idea what 
relationship their investment return will have to the return earned by the stock market"). 
130For a general discussion of the perils of niche investing by ETFs, see Gullapalli, supra 
note 104, at C1.  "Often, mutual-fund sponsors hesitate to launch such niche products because it is 
tough to support trading, record keeping and other chores with a small asset base while keeping 
the expense ratio reasonable."  Id. 
131See, e.g., Carolyn Cui & James T. Areddy, The World Melts for Gold, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 19, 2008, at B1 ("Their [ETF investors] rush to invest has helped fuel soaring prices—gold 
crossed $900 an ounce for a time in the past week, and there are some calls for $1,000—while 
adding volatile new dynamics to the market.") 
132See John Spence, Boom Time for ETFs Prompts Questions; Fast Growth Worries Some, 
Especially as More Funds Target Narrow Sectors, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2007, at C13.  The Wall 
Street Journal reports: 
Many of the new products tend to track areas of the market that have done well 
recently, but when the inevitable downturn hits, investors may run for the exits.  
As a result, ETFs with smaller asset pools run by niche providers may be forced 
to liquidate.  Such a development, Mr. Genoni [a product manager at Vanguard 
98 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 33 
 
With this combination of vulnerabilities, a Morningstar researcher 
has observed that the proliferation of increasingly specialized ETFs may be 
"just a more cost-effective means of producing a bad investor 
experience."133 
 
D.  Lack of a Track Record 
 
The ETF industry, as a whole, is still quite immature, having existed 
for fewer than fifteen years.  Moreover, the vast majority of ETFs currently 
available have come to market in just the past two years.  Investors seeking 
to invest in ETFs then, may have a very difficult time finding meaningful 
track records to examine prior to investing in a fund.134 
Indeed, the two leading researchers of funds, Morningstar and Lipper, 
do not even rate ETFs that are less than three years old.135  Thus, the 
majority of funds in this industry are not professionally rated by the 
industry standards.  Without professional guidance, retail investors will be 
left largely to their own, untrained devices in researching ETFs for 
investment.136 
Any ETF sponsor incapable of providing a concrete record of results 
over a significant period of operations is offering more a promise than a 
demonstrable business model.  Assumptions may be proven incorrect over 
time, while certain sponsors may prove more adroit at minimizing bid-ask 
spreads or boosting fund performance through stock-lending programs.  
Only after viewing several years of results will an investor have a realistic 
sense of the expertise of the management of a particular fund and appreciate 
the difference between theoretical indices and actual investment results. 
 
E.  Tracking Error 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental shortcoming of any ETF is its failure 
                                                                                                             
Group Inc.] said, "could leave a black eye for the ETF industry." 
Id. 
133Gullapalli, supra note 104, at C1. 
134See, e.g., Diya Gullapalli, Why Hot Funds Are Tripping Up Some Investors; ETFs, 
Which Are Meant to Track Benchmarks Increasingly Go Astray, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2007, at 1 
(discussing the problems of short track records and noting that "several newer ETFs with short 
track records are failing to match the hypothetical rates of return they would have achieved in 
previous years if they had existed then"). 
135Eleanor Laise, Green Thumb: New Tools for Picking the Top ETFs, WALL ST. J., June 9, 
2007, at B1. 
136Perhaps not surprisingly, the market has begun to respond with the creation of research 
and advice services that provide advice on selecting ETFs to retail investors.  See id. ("Now, a 
handful of new tools can help investors separate winners from losers, and even show how they 
stack up against comparable mutual funds."). 
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to adhere reliably to the index to which it is purportedly benchmarked.137  
Should SPDRs cease to replicate the S&P 500, for instance, they would stop 
serving as a useful investment alternative to the S&P 500 and undermine 
much of their raison d'être.  Yet management fees, taxes, and other subtle 
sources of investment friction create a divergence between the performance 
of every ETF and its benchmark.  Thus, it is less the existence and more the 
magnitude of this tracking error that should concern an investor.138 
Tracking error will vary from fund to fund, based on the particular 
way in which a fund is managed and may therefore distinguish even ETFs 
that purport to track the very same index.  The Financial Times explains 
this by way of example: 
For example, Lipper calculates that the Lyxor CAC 40 ETF 
had an annualized tracking error of 2.33 per cent in 2005 and 
1.99 per cent in 2006.  In contrast, the Indexis ETF tracking 
the same index recorded annualized tracking errors of 5.44 per 
cent and 4.16 per cent for 2005 and 2006 respectively, while 
the EasyETF CAC 40 registered 4.29 per cent and 2.24 per 
cent.139 
Various factors influence the degree of tracking error in an ETF.  First, a 
fund may choose to replicate the entire composition of its underlying index 
or to use only a representative sample of those securities in its portfolio.  
Although the latter approach may be more cost-effective, it can obviously 
lead to a greater divergence in performance.  Sometimes, full replication 
may be impossible: if an index includes a stock that accounts for 50% of the 
index, for instance, ETFs may be barred from investing anywhere near that 
level of its portfolio in that stock by SEC or self-imposed rules that require 
greater diversification.140 
Second, currency fluctuations may create a disparity in returns for a 
benchmark comprising only foreign stocks if the fund itself is denominated 
 
                                                                                                             
137For a general discussion of tracking error, see Gullapalli, supra note 104, at C1.  "In 
recent months, however, some ETFs have begun diverging widely from the performance of the 
benchmarks they are supposed to follow."  Id. 
138See Eleanor Laise, Indexing & ETFs: ETFs Get a Tough Market Test, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 19, 2007, at A2 (discussing the performance of ETFs following the 1,100 point drop in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average in the month ending August 16, 2007, and noting that, although 
many funds "performed exactly as expected," not all did; in fact, "many investors in more exotic 
ETFs that focus on narrow industry segments or employ complex strategies to produce some 
multiple of an index's gains may have been unpleasantly surprised by those funds' performance"). 
139Hildrey, supra note 44, at 5.  
140Id. (discussing full and partial replication). 
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in U.S. dollars.141 
Third, the particular costs a fund incurs will create greater or lesser 
drag on the fund's performance.  Thus, "[t]racking error will be affected by 
transaction costs, custody costs, the foreign exchange impact of investing in 
overseas securities and differences in the timing of dividend payments, 
among other factors."142 
Tracking error may be most pronounced during volatile markets, such 
as those of this recent summer.143  The Wall Street Journal reports that 
"[w]hile the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index dropped roughly 9% in the 
month ended Aug. 16, many ETFs produced double-digit gains or 
losses."144 Funds that engage in leverage to increase their returns, either 
positively or negatively, are particularly vulnerable to tracking error.145 
The novelty of ETFs has, in many respects, disguised some of their 
limitations.  While many of their positive attributes have been intuitively or 
immediately obvious, their weaknesses have tended to emerge only over 
time, as different cycles in the market have placed ETFs under different 
kinds of pressure.  In addition, the explosive expansion of this industry has 
created large numbers of new funds that are squeezing into increasingly 
narrow investment niches and looking less and less like the prototypical 
broad-based index fund.  As the industry matures and develops a track 
record for these hundreds of new offerings, the true range of their 
vulnerabilities will become more apparent. 
 
V.  A POSITIVE MARKET RESPONSE TO MUTUAL FUNDS 
 
In the first decade of their existence in the United States, ETFs grew 
steadily to approximately 120 funds and $150 billion in assets.146  Then, in 
 
                                                                                                             
141Id. 
142Id. 
143See Tom Lauricella & Diya Gullapalli, Shorting Out: Fast-Money Crowd Embraces 
ETFs, Adding Risk for Individual Investors, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2007, at A1.  "Although ETFs 
are often advertised as an easy way for investors to jump in and out of the market, those who sold  
during the U.S. day [on February 27, 2007] would have lost significantly more than the actual 
index they thought they were mirroring."  Id. 
144Laise, supra note 135, at B1. 
145See Diya Gullapalli & Ian Salisbury, New ETFs Don't Please Everyone; Leveraged 
Funds Are a Hit, but Can Be Tricky, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2007, at B2.  They report: 
Some leveraged funds seek to double the daily performance of a market index 
before fees and expenses, for instance increasing 2% on a day the Standard & 
Poor's 500-stock index goes up 1%.  Other inverse and double-inverse products 
seek the opposite effect—falling by 1% or 2% respectively on a day the index 
they track increases by 1%. 
Id. 
146See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 8, 10. 
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September 2003 (the tenth anniversary of ETFs), New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer announced an investigation into the possible illegal 
market timing of mutual funds.147  That press conference triggered several 
years of exhaustive regulatory investigations into almost all aspects of the 
mutual fund industry, leading to billions of dollars in payments by 
investment advisers to the SEC and state regulatory bodies to settle 
allegations of widespread malfeasance.  Those investigations, in turn, 
prompted the SEC staff to draft a raft of new regulations to address the 
shortcomings of mutual funds and caused academics to explore much of 
what went wrong in the industry.148 
The thoroughgoing unpleasantness in the mutual fund industry also 
triggered a rapid acceleration in the growth rate of ETFs as mutual fund 
investors fled possibly tainted investment products for the perceived safety 
of ETFs.149  Rather than waiting for the new regulations to fix mutual funds, 
ETF investors viewed these new funds as a salubrious market response to 
the failure of mutual funds. 
Indeed, the structure and operation of ETFs endow them with many 
characteristics that render them immune to several of the most notorious 
vulnerabilities of mutual funds, such as market timing, late trading, unfair 
valuation, and hidden fees and expenses.150 
 
A.  Market Timing 
 
                                                                                                             
147See Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, State Investigation 
Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (Sept. 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep /sep03a_03.html. 
148See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, et al., Conference, The $7 Trillion Question: Mutual Funds 
& Investor Welfare, Mutual Funds & Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 55 (2006); 
John C. Bogle, Conference, The $7 Trillion Question: Mutual Funds & Investor Welfare, 
Reflections on the Evolution of Mutual Fund Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45 (2006); Mercer 
E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund as a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund Arbitrage and the SEC's 
Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271 (2006); James D. Cox & John W. 
Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907 
(2005); Tamar Frankel, How Did We Get Into This Mess?, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 133 (2006); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1017 (2005); Martin E. Lybecker, Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A 
Flawed Concept that Deserves Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045 (2005). 
149See generally Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1404-11 (explaining the source of allegations 
of malfeasance in the area of mutual funds by extending the managerial power theory of executive 
compensation to the mutual fund industry). 
150See Kimelman, supra note 7, at 6.  "Several investigations into mutual fund trading 
practices are continuing, and Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission are 
considering ways to change the industry's practices.  Because of their constant repricing, 
exchange-traded funds, which track stock and bond indexes, have been conspicuously immune to 
these problems."  Id. 
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Perhaps the most well-known allegation made by the SEC and state 
regulators against the investment advisers of mutual funds was that the 
advisers were complicit in market timing their own funds.  Because mutual 
funds are priced just once a day, typically at the close of the New York 
stock markets at 4:00 p.m. eastern time, some funds may use stale prices for 
their underlying securities when calculating the fund's NAV.151 
Consider, for instance, a mutual fund that invests in stocks on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).  At 4:00 p.m. eastern time, the TSE has been 
closed for fourteen hours—with another four hours to go before it 
reopens—and therefore, the prices of TSE stocks will not have changed 
during that time.  If, however, Japan has experienced extremely positive or 
extremely negative financial news during the fourteen hours between the 
close of the TSE and the calculation of the U.S. mutual fund's daily NAV, 
the price the mutual fund charges for its shares will be either far too high or 
far too low, at least until the shares are priced again the next day using fresh 
prices from the TSE.  Cognizant of this vulnerability in mutual fund pricing, 
sophisticated institutional investors such as hedge funds sought to move 
large amounts of cash in and out of mutual funds quickly to profit through 
this time zone arbitrage.  Thus far, this kind of market timing is not per se 
illegal.152  
In their public prospectuses, however, many mutual funds avowed 
policies against allowing the timing of their funds.153  Market timing was 
often voluntarily prohibited by investment advisers because market timing 
greatly complicates the operation of funds by portfolio managers, who must 
scramble to invest or divest large blocks of stocks to accommodate 
institutional market timers, and because market timing dilutes the returns of 
long-term fund investors in favor of short-term investors who capture 
immediate returns from their timing activity.  Regulators alleged that 
investment advisers, in contravention of their publicly filed prospectuses, 
nevertheless permitted large institutional investors to market time their 
mutual funds in exchange for particular forms of payment to the adviser.  In 
these illicit quid pro quo arrangements, market timers would typically make 
and hold large investments in certain other funds advised by the same 
investment adviser, who would receive management fees therefrom to offset 
any administrative difficulties in the time fund.  Whereas the investment 
adviser was compensated for its trouble in this scheme, the other, long-term 
 
                                                                                                             
151See Hulbert, supra note 10, at 7 (discussing the appeal of ETFs as an alternative to 
mutual funds and their limitations). 
152See Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1455. 
153See id. 
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investors in the timed fund were not.154 
A fund whose shares are priced constantly throughout the day and 
react more or less immediately to publicly disclosed information—such as 
good or bad news in the Japanese economy—cannot be market timed.  An 
ETF is just such a fund.  The practice of market timing relies upon the 
forward pricing scheme to calculate the NAV of mutual funds and the use 
of stale prices in that computation.  The inherent pricing scheme of ETFs 
simply does not permit this kind of timing arbitrage.  Furthermore, as 
Professor Burton Malkiel has pointed out, the rapid timing of purchases and 
redemptions of ETF shares by sophisticated institutional investors has no 
effect on—and certainly does not hurt—other investors in the fund.155 
 
B.  Late Trading 
 
Another allegation made against mutual fund investment advisers was 
that, again in exchange for compensation, they allowed favored clients to 
late trade their funds.156  Unlike market timing, late trading is per se illegal, 
no matter what a fund's prospectus might purport to allow or to prohibit.157  
Late trading involves placing an order to buy or sell mutual fund shares 
after 4:00 p.m., when the markets have closed and the price of fund shares 
has been calculated.158 
Not only does late trading allow investors to know exactly whether a 
fund's price has dropped (making it a good day to buy) or risen (making it a 
good day to sell), but it also allows investors to react to any financial news 
that arises after the close of business.159  If, for instance, dramatically nega-
tive news is announced at 4:01 p.m., any investor who placed a sell order on 
mutual fund's shares for that day would escape from the fund before the 
price fell the next day to reflect the bad news.160  And, similarly, buying 
after learning of good news would enable an investor to acquire fund shares 
for an artificially low price and to generate immediate profits if the shares 
 
                                                                                                             
154See id. 
155See Authers, supra note 16, at 12.  Professor Malkiel states: "There are those who really 
believe they can time the market and trade in and out—I don't think they can, but there are those 
who believe that.  If they do that within a mutual fund framework, they create costs for people 
sitting in the mutual fund."  Id.  The Financial Times reports further: "In an ETF, short-termists are 
free to do their own thing, without damaging fellow shareholders who want to 'buy and hold,' 
[Professor Malkiel] argues."  Id. 
156See Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1458-60. 
157Id. at 1455-58. 
158Id. at 1458-59. 
159Id. at 1459. 
160Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1459. 
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were then sold shortly thereafter.161 
But how is late trading possible if mutual fund orders must be made 
before 4:00 p.m., and fund shares are priced at 4:00 p.m.?  In fact, the 
technical and recordkeeping steps necessary to process mutual fund 
transactions take several hours to administer, as information on purchase 
and sale orders is gathered from brokerage houses across the country and 
aggregated by the fund's back-office administrators.162  During that time, 
complicit intermediaries can "lose" or "find" orders favorable to important 
clients, if they so choose.163 
Again, the radically different pricing apparatus of ETFs insulates 
them against this kind of machination.  Only the slow, cumbersome process 
of aggregating and calculating client orders renders mutual funds 
susceptible to this kind of manipulation.  The trading of ETF shares happens 
almost instantaneously on stock exchanges continuously throughout the 
day, making the process far more transparent and free from manipulation.164 
 
C.  Fair Valuation 
 
If a mutual fund holds in its portfolio an underlying investment that is 
highly illiquid, the process of determining the fund's NAV quickly becomes 
complicated.165  Consider, for example, a mutual fund that invests in a 
small, private company—perhaps a recently founded technology venture.166 
 Since the shares in that company do not trade publicly, investors such as 
the mutual fund can determine the shares' value only occasionally, perhaps 
when the company holds a new round of financing or when the company 
commissions an external auditor to make an appraisal.167  In the weeks, 
months, or years between those valuation events, the last-known price of the 
company's stock may become very stale. 
If during that time the company has successfully prosecuted a new 
patent, for instance, the value of its shares will almost certainly have 
increased, notwithstanding the unchanged and artificially low last-known 
price.168  Similarly, if the company has become the target of serious litiga-
tion, the value of its shares will very probably have decreased, again 
 
                                                                                                             
161Id. at 1458-60. 
162Id. at 1459. 
163Id. at 1458-60. 
164See Hall, supra note 24, at 1127.  
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166Id. at 1458. 
167Id. 
168Id.  
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notwithstanding the artificially high last-known price.169  Because mutual 
fund advisers are compensated by management fees that are computed as 
function of the assets they manage, an artificially high calculation of those 
assets will lead to inappropriately high management fees for the investment 
adviser.170  Accordingly, investment advisers are legally obliged to "fair 
value" the investments in their portfolio, if reliable market prices are not 
available.171 
The fair valuation process may involve using third-party appraisers, 
reasonable proxies, or computational models to derive a current and more 
reasonable value for rarely priced investments.172  Of course, this backup 
valuation process often involves a certain degree of judgment and 
discretion. Another of the charges leveled against mutual fund investment 
advisers in the late imbroglio was that they exercised this judgment in their 
own favor and to the detriment of shareholders in the fund.173 
ETFs avoid the perils of unfair valuation by trafficking in publicly 
traded investments.174  Any investor who wishes to purchase a creation unit 
from an ETF must, of necessity, present the fund with a basket of securities 
representing the overall holdings of the ETF.175  All the participants in this 
system will, therefore, be cognizant of recent and reliable prices for each of 
the ETF's component investments.  The fund sponsor will not be at liberty 
to substitute its self-interested judgment to compute the NAV of the ETF 
and thereby charge an artificially inflated management fee. 
 
D.  Hidden Fees and Expenses 
 
Because mutual funds handle a variety of administrative tasks 
associated with their funds' investors, they charge a variety of fees.176  
Mutual funds or their agents are responsible for tracking the purchase and 
sale of all fund shares, for generating statements to investors, for 
maintaining safe custody of the fund's assets, and for promoting the sale of 
fund shares to intermediaries such as brokers and dealers.177  For each of 
these services, mutual funds charge transfer agency fees, account 
 
                                                                                                             
169Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1458. 
170Id. at 1457. 
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172Id. at 1458. 
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maintenance fees, custodian fees, 12b-1 fees, and more.178  Occasionally, 
mutual fund advisers opt to waive some of these fees for limited periods.179  
Accordingly, the fee and expense table contained in the prospectus of a 
typical mutual fund which must record all these permutations can be an 
extraordinarily convoluted read. 
ETFs, by contrast, are relatively free from layers of disparate fees.  
Often, they charge only a single management fee, from which they 
discharge any and all of their operational obligations.  This one fee makes 
pricing comparison amongst ETFs comparatively straightforward for 
investors. 
Even as a bullish market has dissipated much of the negative press 
surrounding mutual funds since 2003, ETFs remain more attractive to many 
who might previously have invested in mutual funds, and these newer funds 
now attract the majority of new investments in indexed investment funds.180 
 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF ETFS 
 
As the ETF industry continues its dramatic debut and rapid march 
upon the $2 trillion mark, which some analysts believe it will reach by 
2010, two possible developments may place even greater importance upon 
the study of positive and negative attributes of ETFs.  First, administrators 
may grant ETFs access to the menus of investment options available to 
investors in retirement accounts, such as pensions, 401(k)s, and other 
defined contribution plans.  Second, the SEC may grant applications that 
have already been filed by fund sponsors for the formation of actively 
managed ETFs.  Should either or both of these eventualities come to pass, 
the amount of money—and, perhaps more importantly, the proportion of 
retirement savings—invested in these new investment vehicles will grow 
even more rapidly.  The effect of this additional stress on a largely untested 
industry is a matter of conjecture but, if the elder siblings of ETFs—mutual 
funds—are any guide, the ETF industry may soon become the scene of 
crime and punishment. 
 
A.  Gaining Access to Retirement Accounts 
 
Currently, $2.5 trillion are invested in retirement savings accounts.181 
 Those accounts are typically overseen by a plan administrator, who 
 
                                                                                                             
178See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 47. 
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chooses what investments to include in a menu of choices for plan 
participants.  Mutual funds have long dominated this field, and most 401(k) 
plans, for example, provide employees with a choice of funds in which to 
invest.  If a fund sponsor can persuade the administrator to include ETFs in 
the relatively limited choice of options, ETFs would almost certainly enjoy 
a rapid increase in assets under management.  To date, however, two 
impediments have stood in the way of the inclusion of ETFs: the presence 
of mutual funds and the brokerage fees associated with ETFs. 
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ETF sponsors will need to persuade plan administrators that ETFs can 
offer plan participants something that mutual funds cannot.182  One of the 
chief selling points of ETFs—their ability to trade rapidly and in real 
time—may be unlikely to impress trustees who are charged with overseeing 
plans intended to safeguard retirement assets for the long term.  In addition, 
the 8,000 mutual funds currently on the market provide an equal if not 
greater number of investment options as the 500 ETFs available. 
Similarly, brokerage fees may be an additional expense that 
retirement plan administrators will not wish to impose upon their plans' 
participants.  Currently, many investment advisers offer no-load mutual 
funds, which investors can purchase and redeem without paying transaction 
fees.183 
But the allure of this potential market is a powerful one.  The retire-
ment market is large and may soon expand considerably.  The recent 
Pension Protection Act of 2006184 authorized plan administrators to switch 
the default on participants' accounts from uninvested to invested.  That is, 
previously, any employee who saved money to a retirement plan would be 
required to make an affirmative choice to have those funds invested in 
anything other than cash or a money market account.  But many employees 
are either too busy or unsophisticated to manage their retirement accounts 
effectively.185  Accordingly, large amounts of retirement assets sat 
uninvested.  With this new federal legislation, however, plan administrators 
can arrange to have funds invested in a relatively conservative set of broad-
based index funds.  This legislation is likely to improve the return on the 
savings of many future retirees, though it also has a healthy effect on the 
profits of those default index funds' investment advisers. 
Given these substantial financial incentives, ETF sponsors are 
diligently lobbying plan administrators to add ETFs to their fund menus.186  
In that effort, some sponsors have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the 
 
                                                                                                             
182See id. ("Owen Concannon, a senior analyst at Financial Research Corporation, the 
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183See id. 
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brokerage fees associated with their funds, so as to remove impediments 
from dollar-cost averaging.  These efforts appear to be making some sort of 
headway, as some administrators have begun to acquiesce.187 
 
B.  Securing Permission to Offer Actively Managed ETFs 
 
Active management is another source of possible growth in the ETF 
industry.188  In the mutual fund context, the vast majority of funds are 
actively managed, even though there are a significant number of passive 
index funds also.  Many market analysts project that the number of ETFs 
and the amount of assets invested therein would both jump dramatically if 
the SEC authorized the use of active management.  As we have seen, active 
management faces a number of technical difficulties in the ETF context—
chiefly, the ability to reconcile a fund manager's interest in keeping the 
fund's composition and investment strategy secret with the need for 
investors to know whether the price of fund shares accurately reflects the 
value of the fund's portfolio.189 
The pending applications—filed by Vanguard, among others—
propose sampling strategies that would disclose a substantial proportion of 
the fund.  Claiming that the disclosed portion would be representative of the 
undisclosed portion, the sponsors argue that investors can thereby evaluate 
the value of the entire portfolio without knowing every detail about the 
fund's composition and strategy.  To date, these applications have been 
made for funds that would track Treasury securities, which are relatively 
fungible and, the applicants suggest, ideal ingredients for this kind of 
ETF.190 
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Again, despite obstacles, ETF sponsors are aggressively pursuing 
expansion into untapped new fields of assets that active management would 
make available.  The existing pattern of ETF growth, when combined with 
the possibility of successfully gaining entrance to retirement accounts and 
the market for active management, suggests that the ETF industry will 
continue its breakneck expansion. 
 
C.  Future Vulnerabilities from Conflicts of Interest 
 
What can we expect from this future growth?  If all goes well, ETF 
entrepreneurs will be rewarded for developing a helpful new means of 
investment, and investors will indicate their satisfaction with the services 
ETFs provide by sending their assets to them to satisfy a wide variety of 
investing needs.  But perhaps it is naïve to assume that such explosive 
growth will occur without growing pains.  Indeed, it is difficult to forget 
that ETFs owe a significant portion of their popularity and success to the 
debacles of their older siblings, mutual funds.  Perhaps the experience of 
difficulties in the mutual fund industry might provide instructive warnings 
for the ETF industry. 
The unifying theme of the allegations of malfeasance in the mutual 
fund industry was the investment advisers' decision to succumb to the 
temptations created by conflicts of interest.  When confronted by institu-
tional investors who wished to market time mutual funds, for instance, 
investment advisers were forced to choose between the financial health of 
long-term investors in those funds and their own revenues, which the 
market timers were promising to increase.  Similarly, late trading also 
involved a quid pro quo between investment advisers and the investors who 
asked those advisers to abet illegal trading in exchange for increased assets 
under management, which led directly to increased revenues from 
management fees.191 
One of the great successes of the ETF industry has been the ability to 
create a market—rather than a regulatory or litigated—solution to much of 
the mutual fund difficulties.  Nevertheless, ETFs are not free from their own 
possible conflicts of interest.  One particular source of vulnerability 
involves the stock lending plans, whereby ETFs lend their stocks to other 
                                                                                                             
An actively managed ETF could delay revealing its holdings.  But the longer the 
delay, the more likely that the ETF's market price will vary widely from the value 
of its holdings.  And even with long delays—say, a week—freeloaders could 
watch the fund's share price fluctuate relative to its most recent disclosed 
portfolio.  And they could figure out which stocks the ETF is buying and selling. 
Id. 
191See Birdthistle, supra note 25, at 1460. 
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market participants in exchange for a fee.  Since many ETFs hold 
themselves out as vehicles for tracking a benchmark, their sponsors are 
under no affirmative duty to boost returns with the proceeds of these stock 
lending plans.  Competitive market forces may encourage ETF sponsors to 
use the proceeds to increase fund returns, but the mutual fund precedent 
demonstrates that market forces may not succeed in disciplining investment 
advisers who choose to direct such proceeds directly into their own pockets. 
Another possible pitfall for ETFs may be the dystopia predicted by 
Bogle.192  If, as he fears, investors saving for retirement do in fact manage 
to hurt themselves and their savings by aggressively trading their accounts 
in and out of ETFs, the ETF may be discredited as a savings vehicle. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The ETF industry presents a fascinating opportunity to study the 
growth and development of a promising young specimen of financial 
innovation.  When the mutual fund stumbled, prompting litigators and 
regulators to begin drafting complaints and regulations, many investors 
found a solution to the troubles in ETFs.  With ETFs now headed quickly 
towards a potentially awkward adolescence in which they will be forced to 
take on important new responsibilities—particularly as the SEC is 
beginning to approve actively managed ETFs—the pressure of these novel 
and significant developments may expose weaknesses in their design and 
execution with profound financial consequences.  By beginning with a 
thorough understanding of their structure, benefits, and shortcomings, 
scholars can expand upon this theoretical examination of ETFs to ascertain 
the strengths and weaknesses of ETF's architecture before these funds are 
asked to take the strain of huge new infusions of investment. 
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